cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11079345

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Serbia is pursuing two intertwined energy agendas: reducing its long-standing dependence on Russian gas and building renewable generation capacity capable of eventually replacing coal.

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The rise of Chinese investment in Serbia’s renewable energy sector has revived debate over a new form of energy dependency, this time technological and financial. Chinese companies operate in Serbia in several capacities at once: as majority shareholders in project companies, as general contractors under EPC arrangements — engineering, procurement and construction — and as suppliers of wind turbines or solar inverters.

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Several of Serbia’s largest wind projects follow a similar pattern. A Western developer — Nordic, Dutch-Belgian or British — advances a project to a mature stage, once permits are secured, land rights obtained and sometimes a state-aid quota won through public auctions, before selling a majority stake, or nearly the entire project, to a Chinese investor or group of investors.

This mechanism has applied to several of the country’s largest wind farms. In one of the most documented cases, the project was initially 100% owned by private Serbian investors before being sold to Chinese state-linked entities.

An emblematic case of divestment and political proximity

One of the sellers in that transaction, Mr. Nikola Petrović, had a long-standing personal relationship with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, in office since 2017. Several analysts describe this proximity as a governance issue rather than a mere biographical detail, in a sector where the awarding of projects and public quotas remains sensitive. The account of this transaction must name this link explicitly to grasp its significance.

Mr. Petrović headed Elektromreža Srbije (EMS), Serbia’s electricity transmission grid operator, from September 2012 to late 2016. He remained a 50% shareholder in the project company Crni Vrh Power until 2023, before divesting his stake. This trajectory illustrates the overlap observed between past public office, personal networks and stakes in energy project companies in Serbia.

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The technological dimension of the risk [lies in] the nature of the equipment installed. Mr. Stefan Vladisavljev, an analyst at the BFPE foundation (Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence), and Mr. Caspar Hobhouse, an analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies, point specifically to wind turbines that are remotely connected and controllable, as well as solar inverters — equipment whose operation and maintenance underpin a fast-growing global market, as highlighted by a recent study on the global solar operations and maintenance market. Mr. Zhang Chuanwei, president of Chinese turbine manufacturer Mingyang Smart Energy, leads one of the industrial groups whose equipment is installed in several Serbian wind farms.

Several Western countries have already restricted the use of Chinese equipment in their energy infrastructure on security grounds, a precedent that fuels questions over the path Belgrade is following.

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Archived

Over 113,000 people crossed the border between Russia and Georgia in just one week, at a time when rumors of a new mobilization are increasing. The Kremlin denies preparing such a measure, but recruitment is becoming more aggressive, and many Russians prefer to leave the country ahead of the parliamentary elections in September.

Traffic through the Verhni Lars border crossing, the main land route between the two countries, has increased significantly in the second half of August. According to Russian authorities, over 20,000 people crossed the border on some days.

In total, over 33,000 vehicles and 113,000 people crossed the border in just one week, writes Politico.

The number is reminiscent of the chaos in the fall of 2022 when Vladimir Putin announced the „partial” mobilization of 300,000 reservists. Over 100,000 Russians entered Georgia in just a few days, and hundreds of thousands fled to Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, or other destinations.

This time there is no official mobilization order yet. That is precisely the difference: people are no longer waiting for the Kremlin’s announcement but are trying to leave preve

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Rumors point to the period after the elections for the State Duma, scheduled between September 18 and 20, as the moment when the Kremlin could announce a new call to arms.

At the beginning of August, the Russian Supreme Court excluded the federal list of the Yabloko party from the elections, the only party that was trying to participate with an explicit anti-war program.

Ukraine claims that Vladimir Putin aims to bring hundreds of thousands more people into the army. President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia intends to recruit 300,000 soldiers after the September elections and another 300,000 next year.

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Official denials have not dispelled fears, especially after human rights organizations reported an intensification of forced recruitment.

In several regions of Russia, police and military recruiters have reportedly started picking up men from the streets, workplaces, or even from their homes. They are taken to recruitment centers and pressured to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense.

„It has turned into a manhunt,” described human rights lawyer Alexei Tabalov. According to him, the methods used include deception, blackmail, violence, and threats.

Recruiters target vulnerable individuals, such as men with debts, suspects in criminal cases, detainees, students with problems, or people who can be easily coerced. There are also cases where conscripts have allegedly been forced to sign contracts to be sent to Ukraine.

In the city of Omsk, a 31-year-old man was reportedly detained for drinking beer in the street and taken directly to a military selection center, where he was pressured to enlist. In the Penza region, locals reported that men are taken from the streets or searched from door to door.

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The system is starting to show signs that it can no longer cover the losses on the front. According to Western officials cited by The Guardian, Russia loses about 6,000 more troops each month than it can recruit, despite bringing in almost 1,000 people into the army daily.

A new mobilization would be risky for Putin. The one in September 2022 sparked protests in several regions, a massive exodus of the active population, and a decline in trust in authorities. The departure of a large number of specialists also affected the economy, already facing a labor shortage.

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Archived

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11007174

Russia has begun work on its own history textbook of Ukraine “from ancient times”, intended for schoolchildren in territories that are “still under the control of the Kyiv regime”, according to Mikhail Myagkov, scientific director of the Russian Military Historical Society, who announced the project at a press conference held by state news agency RIA Novosti.

According to Myagkov, the textbook will cover the “unity of the ancient Rus people”, the emergence of “Ukrainism”, and those who allegedly promoted it. The authors have also promised to explain how “today’s Kyiv regime sank to this point”, and to present the “true story” about the shared history of Russia and Ukraine.

Myagkov said work on the textbook is already underway but gave no publication date. He also did not explain how the book would be distributed in Ukrainian territory, calling that “a separate question”.

The initiative follows an earlier textbook from Russia’s Ministry of Education, “History of Our Land: Donbas and Novorossiya”, aimed at pupils in grades 5–7 in occupied areas of Ukraine. One assignment in that book asks children to explain why participants in Russia’s invasion are “worthy of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War”, using Russia’s term for the war on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945. It is set to be used in schools from 1 September.

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Archived

Four months after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at a time when much of the world was pulling away from sensitive trade with Russia, the Chinese manufacturer Jiangsu Jingchuang Electronics Co. went deeper in.

As it would later recount in its prospectus, that was when Jingchuang established a business relationship with Kontakt AO, a military-linked Russian company. The two maintained that relationship as Western sanctions against Russia and its trade partners tightened, with just one apparent tweak: “Due to the impacts of the changing international political situation,” Jingchuang wrote last year, Kontakt was now buying through its “partner” in Kyrgyzstan.

The arrangement offers a glimpse into how Central Asian transshippers are helping China continue to supply Russia and—as Western leaders have increasingly warned—circumvent sanctions.

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China is “the largest supplier of dual-use technology items that have enabled Russia to build and sustain its military operations in Ukraine,” the U.S.-China Commission wrote in a report last November. And Central Asian operators facilitate a major chunk of that trade.

The European Union in April singled out Kyrgyzstan as a key facilitator of Russia’s sanctions-circumventing trade, blocking member states from exporting to it certain sensitive tech. According to the Center for European Policy Analysis, a think tank headquartered in Washington, D.C., Kyrgyzstan imports “from China for onward export to Russia” increased from $300 million in 2021 to more than $3 billion in 2023.

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Archived